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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STATE OF NEW YORK, et a l,
Plaintiffs
Civil Action No. 98-1233 (CKK)

v.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending before the Court is a motion by Defendant Microsoft Corporation
(“Microsoft”) seeking “dismissal of the Non-Settling States’ demand for equitable relief.” See
Microsoft Mot. at 1. Microsoft filed its motion and memorandum in support thereof following
the remand of the above-captioned case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit and immediately prior to the commencement of evidentiary proceedings on the issue of
remedy for Microsoft’s violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Litigating States1
oppose Microsoft’s motion on multiple grounds. Upon review of Defendant’s motion, Plaintiffs’
opposition, Defendant’s reply, the brief of the United States as amicus curiae, the brief of the
State of New York as amicus curiae, and the brief of twenty-four other states2 as amici curiae, the

The record in this case reflects that the nine states and the District of Columbia
proceeding to litigate this case prefer to be called the “Litigating States,” as opposed to the “NonSettling States.” As a matter of courtesy, the Court will refer to this group of plaintiffs by their
chosen title, or simply as “Plaintiffs.”
2This amicus brief was filed by the States of Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,

Court concludes that Defendant’s motion shall be denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
On May 18,1998, the United States and a group of state plaintiffs filed separate civil
complaints alleging antitrust violations by Microsoft and seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions barring the company’s allegedly unlawful conduct. See United States v. Microsoft
Corp,, 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(D.D.C.), the federal government brought claims pursuant to federal law, while in State o f New
York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233 (D.D.C.), the Plaintiff States brought claims
pursuant to both federal and state law. These two cases were consolidated, and following a
bench trial in the consolidated cases, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson concluded that Microsoft
had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See generally United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). Correspondingly, Judge Jackson held Microsoft liable
for violations of the state antitrust laws analogous to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in each
of the nineteen Plaintiff States and the District of Columbia.4 Id. at 54. Microsoft filed an appeal
in both cases. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit deferred to Judge Jackson’s factual findings, altered
his findings of liability-affirming in part and reversing in part, and vacated the remedy decree.
See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34.

Washington, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
3The history of this case is lengthy and complicated. As not all of the historical details
are pertinent to the instant motion, the Court will recount, in summary form, limited portions of
the procedural history of this case.
4The suit styled as State o f New York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233, was
originally brought by twenty states and the District of Columbia. One state withdrew from the
action prior to the issuance of liability findings by the District Court. Another state settled its
claims in July of 2001.
2

The Court of Appeals remanded the cases to the District Court with instructions to hold a
“remedies-specific evidentiary hearing,” id. at 103, and to “fashion an appropriate remedy” in
light o f the revised liability findings, id. at 105. Following remand, pursuant to Court order, the
parties in the two consolidated cases entered into intensive settlement negotiations. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2001) (order requiring
the parties to enter into settlement negotiations). The settlement negotiations did not resolve
both cases in their entirety. Flowever, the United States and Microsoft were able to reach a
resolution in United States v. Microsoft Corp. in the form of a proposed consent decree. The
settlement negotiations were partially successful with regard to the states’ case, State o f New
York, et. al. v. Microsoft Corp.; a portion of the Plaintiff States joined in the settlement between
the United States and Microsoft. Consequently, these states have elected not to proceed to a
remedies-specific hearing in State o f New York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp. Those states which
opted not to join the settlement between the United States and Microsoft-the Litigating
States-have proposed a remedy distinct from that presented in the proposed consent decree.
Microsoft’s motion addresses only the continuing request for injunctive relief by these Litigating
States.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Ordinarily, the Court would commence its discussion of a dispositive motion, such as a
motion to dismiss, with a succinct statement of the legal standard applicable to the pending
motion. In this instance, the parties have provided little guidance on the threshold question of
the appropriate legal standard. Despite labeling its motion as a “motion to dismiss,” Microsoft
does not identify any basis in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which permits the filing of a
post-liability “motion to dismiss.” Upon examination by the Court, the authorization for
3

Defendant’s motion is not immediately apparent in the Federal Rules. Still, the Court will
endeavor to identify the proper basis for Defendant’s motion, and hence, the applicable legal
standard, before proceeding to the merits of the arguments contained therein.
Taking the title of Microsoft’s motion as a starting point, the Court turns to Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which, by its own title, concerns “Defenses and
Objections-When and How Presented-By Pleading or Motion-Motion for Judgment on
Pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be “made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Rule 12(b) further specifies that where “a pleading sets forth a
claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief.” Id.
Clearly the parties are well past the pleading stage and indeed, are past a trial on the merits of
Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, at a minimum, Microsoft’s “motion to dismiss” does not appear to fit
the ordinary parameters of a motion pursuant to subsection (b) of Rule 12.*
5
Arguments presented by Microsoft in its reply memorandum give the impression that
Microsoft has based its request for dismissal upon an asserted lack o f subject matter jurisdiction.
See generally Microsoft Reply. Given this position, Microsoft’s motion could be considered in
accordance with Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
(“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction

5Rule 12(b) applies to the following defenses: “(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process,
(5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
4

of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). Accordingly, the Court will treat any
of Microsoft’s arguments which can be characterized as concerning subject matter jurisdiction as
having been raised pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3).6
This conclusion, however, does not provide an appropriate standard for many of
Microsoft’s arguments which cannot be couched in terms of jurisdiction and instead appear to
raise issues relating to judgment on the merits. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)
(“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a
cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure
to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for
want of jurisdiction.”).7 In this regard, Microsoft’s motion reads largely as an attack on the
liability findings of the Court of Appeals in this case. To the extent that Microsoft’s motion
challenges the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ case, for lack of a better standard, the Court will
treat the motion as a motion for partial summary judgment.8

6“ [I]t is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations
of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.” See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In
its consideration of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a district court may look beyond
the pleadings to inquire into facts pertinent to its jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,
735 n.4 (1947).
7Beyond an initial determination that “a plaintiffs jurisdiction-conferring claims are not
insubstantial on their face, no further consideration of the merits of the claim(s) is relevant to a
determination of the court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
542 n. 10 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If, after making the threshold
determination to exercise jurisdiction, the court finds that the plaintiffs allegations do not state a
ground for relief, the ensuing dismissal of the case “would be on the merits, not for want of
jurisdiction.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 682.
sFor Microsoft’s non-jurisdictional arguments, the Court may apply the ordinary
summary judgment standard. Summary judgment should be granted only if no genuine issues of
5

III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ action arises, in part, under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, which provides that
“ [a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief .. . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . ” 15 U.S.C.
§ 26. In addition to the Clayton Act, Plaintiffs’ request for equitable relief rests upon the finding
by the District Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Defendant violated the various
state statutes analogous to the federal antitmst statutes. Plaintiffs in this case seek equitable
relief in their capacity as parens patriae “to prevent or repair harm to [their] quasisovereign
interests,” Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972) (internal quotations omitted),
resulting from federal and state antitrust violations already found in this case by the District
Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34; Microsoft,
87 F. Supp. 2d 30.
Microsoft’s “motion to dismiss” attacks Plaintiffs’ right to seek equitable relief on
numerous fronts. Microsoft couches its primary arguments in terms o f “standing” and, in doing
so, merges and mingles a number of distinct doctrines. Microsoft primarily relies upon the
doctrines of “antitrust standing,” “antitrust injury,” and “parens patriae standing.” In the
discussion to follow, the Court will address each of these arguments, as well as Microsoft’s
secondary arguments.

material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Bayer v. United
States Dep't o f Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
6

A.

Antitrust Standing and Injury
One of Microsoft’s central, though vaguely articulated,9 arguments for dismissal relies

upon the complementary doctrines of antitrust standing and antitrust injury. In short, Microsoft
argues that Plaintiffs have not satisfied “all of the requirements of Section 16 . . . including proof
of antitrust injury and a causal connection between the injury and the actions found to be
anticompetitive.” Microsoft Reply at 12; accord Microsoft Mem. at 22.
The label “antitrust standing” has traditionally been applied to a court’s evaluation of the
relationship between the antitrust plaintiffs harm and the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant.
See Associated Gen. Contractors o f California, Inc. v. California State Council o f Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 535 & n.31 (1983). Thus, antitrust standing has been characterized as aw ay to
capture the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a “direct link between the antitmst
violation and the antitrust injury.” Greater Rockford Energy and Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
998 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1993). The doctrine of antitrust standing reflects the Supreme
Court’s attempt to articulate a test for recovery of treble damages pursuant to Section 4 of the
Clayton Act that will not “encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged
wrongdoing.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536. Notwithstanding this attempt,
there exists no “black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.” Id. Instead, where
injury has been established, the decision as to whether the law affords a remedy is to be based
upon a variety of factors, and ultimately upon the specific circumstances of the case. Id. at 536-

9The centrality of the issues of antitrust standing and injury is not strikingly apparent
from Microsoft’s opening memorandum, in part, because Microsoft does not initially distinguish
its discussion of parens patriae standing from its discussion of antitrust standing and injury.
Nevertheless, the Court draws this distinction at the outset to reflect the fact that the case law
which establishes the doctrine of parens patriae standing proceeds along a separate channel from
the body of law that defines antitrust standing and injury. See infra Section III.B.
7

37 .
Distinct from the antitrust standing requirement is the earlier-articulated requirement of
antitrust injury. The requirement of antitrust injury arises out of the Supreme Court’s
announcement in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), that
plaintiffs seeking “to recover treble damages [pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act] on account of
§ 7 [Clayton Act] violations,. . . must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts
unlawful.” 429 U.S. at 489. The Brunswick Court explained further that “[t]he injury should
reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible
by the violation.” Id. In other words, the antitrust injury requirement specifies that a “plaintiffs
injury be caused by the anticompetitive aspect of the defendant’s illegal conduct.” William H.
Page, The Scope o f Liability fo r Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1447 (1985) (cited
with approval for “distinguishing concepts of antitrust injury and antitrust standing” in Cargill
Inc. v. Monfort o f Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986)).
Although the Brunswick Court’s enunciation of the requirement of “antitrust injury”
concerned Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the antitrust injury requirement did not remain confined
to Section 4 claims. Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitmst laws” may sue for treble
damages, 15 U.S.C. § 15, while Section 16 of the Clayton Act entitles “ [a]ny person, firm,
corporation, or association . . . to sue for and have injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 26. Despite the differences between
“actual” and “threatened” injury, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cargill extended the doctrine
of “antitmst injury” beyond suits for damages under Section 4 to suits for injunctive relief
8

pursuant to Section 16. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110-113. In doing so, the Court concluded that
“actual” and “threatened” injury were part of a “single set of injuries” for which Section 4 and
Section 16 provided “complementary remedies.” Id. at 113. However, the Cargill Court
expressly noted that the antitrust standing inquiry would not translate identically to a Section 16
suit, as some of the factors which apply to an antitrust standing inquiry in a Section 4 case, such
as “the potential for duplicative recovery, the complexity of apportioning damages, and the
existence of other parties that have been more directly harmed,” are typically inapposite to
Section 16 cases. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n.6. This difference results from the fact that a broad
potential for recovery is not as troublesome where the only remedies available are equitable. Id.
(“ [A]s we recognized in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., ‘the fact is that one injunction is as
effective as 100, and concomitantly, that 100 injunctions are no more effective than one.’ 405
U.S. at 261.”).
As the separate doctrines of antitrust standing and antitrust injury exist, in part, to “set
economically rational limits . . . on the frequency of antitrust litigation,” Page, 37 Stan L. Rev. at
1446, the doctrines are “commonly applied at an early stage of litigation, in either a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment,” id. at 1447-48. Given that both doctrines serve to establish
the proper scope of antitrust liability, id. at 1447, logic dictates that where liability has been
found, and affirmed at the appellate level, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have
necessarily concluded that the requirements of antitrust standing and antitrust injury have been
satisfied. In this case, the Court of Appeals’ findings of antitrust standing and injury are implicit,
if not express, in its order that the District Court “on remand . . . after affording the parties a
proper opportunity to be heard, can fashion an appropriate remedy for Microsoft’s antitrust
violations.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 105; see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 103 (“We therefore
9

vacate the District Court’s final judgment, and remand with instructions to conduct a remediesspecific evidentiary hearing.”). The Court, therefore, must consider the effect of the implicit and
explicit findings by the Court of Appeals.
1.

Law-of-the-Case Doctrine and the Mandate Rule

Where issues have been resolved at a prior stage in the litigation, based upon principles of
judicial economy, courts generally decline to revisit these issues. More than a mere rule-ofthumb, the “ Taw-of-the-case doctrine’ refers to a family of rules embodying the general concept
that a court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not reopen questions decided (i.e.,
established as the law of the case) by that court or a higher one in earlier phases.” Crocker v.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The doctrine bars reconsideration of
a court’s explicit decisions, as well as those issues decided by necessary implication. Id.;
LaShawnA. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“The law-of-the-case
doctrine, the Supreme Court said, turns ‘on whether a court previously decide[d] upon a rule of
law . . . not whether, or how well, it explained the decision.’”) (quoting Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)) (alteration in Christianson).
Similar to the law-of-the-case doctrine is the “mandate rule,” a ‘“ more powerful version’
of the law-of-the-case doctrine, which prevents courts from reconsidering issues that have
already been decided in the same case.” Independent Petroleum A ss’n o f America v. Babbitt, 235
F.3d 588, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“IPAA IF ) (quoting LaShawn, 87 F.3d at 1393 n.3 (“ [A]n even
more powerful version of the [law-of-the-case] doctrine—sometimes called the ‘mandate rule’—
requires a lower court to honor the decisions of a superior court in the same judicial system.”)).
“Under the mandate rule, ‘an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the
mandate issued by an appellate court.’” Id. at 596-97 (quoting Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
10

334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948)).
Based upon these principles, the Court cannot question the sufficiency of either antitrust
standing or antitrust injury at this late point in the proceedings. To do so would contradict the
law of the case, specifically the Court of Appeals’ opinion and the ensuing mandate, which
affirmed in part the liability findings for violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the
applicable state-law counterparts. Thus, application of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the
mandate rule to this case precludes consideration, at this late stage, of Microsoft’s antitmst
standing and antitmst injury arguments. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 00-5212 and
00-5213 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 2001) (mandate affirming in part and reversing in part the District
Court’s findings of liability, remanding in part, and vacating the remedial order in full).
2.

Jurisdiction, Law-of-the-Case Doctrine, and the Mandate Rule

Microsoft attempts to rescue its position from foreclosure by the law-of-the-case doctrine
and the mandate rule by arguing that the issues it raises are jurisdictional. There are two
fundamental flaws in this argument. First, the doctrines of antitmst standing and antitmst injury
are not jurisdictional. Second, as discussed in greater detail below, the law-of-the-case doctrine
applies equally to jurisdictional issues.
Ordinarily, a reference to “standing” would raise issues of Article III jurisdiction and the
judicially created “prudential” considerations that often accompany an analysis of Article III
standing, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).10 It is well-settled, however, that

10The Supreme Court explained in Allen:
The Art. Ill doctrine that requires a litigant to have “standing” to invoke the power
of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines. “In essence the
question o f standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, [422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)]. Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the
11

antitrust standing is a doctrine separate and distinct from “[t]he Art. Ill doctrine that requires a
litigant to have ‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court.” Id. The doctrine of antitrust
standing “requires more than the constitutional minimum for the ‘case or controversy’ that brings
jurisdiction to Article III courts.” 2 Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law *| 335, at 287 (2d ed.
2000); see also Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31 (“[T]he focus of the doctrine
of ‘antitrust standing’ is somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional doctrine.”);
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, 289 F.3d 98, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“Unlike constitutional standing, this court’s jurisdiction does not turn on antitrust standing.”).
Likewise, antitrust standing is not one of the prudential limits imposed in conjunction with
Article Ill’s express limitations.11 Daniel Berger and Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework

exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising
another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that
a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
See [Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation o f Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-475 (1982)]. The requirement of standing,
however, has a core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. [Id. at 472],
468 U.S. at 750-51.
“ The distinction between prudential and true Article III standing is immaterial in this
discussion because the D.C. Circuit treats prudential aspects of standing as being “akin” to core
Article III requirements for purposes of assessing subject matter jurisdiction. American
Immigration Lawyers Ass 'n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Notwithstanding
this treatment, the D.C. Circuit recognizes that the prudential aspect of standing is “an element
that the courts must dispense with if Congress so provides.” Maryland People’s Counsel v.
FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“Congress may
grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing
rules.”).
While there can be said to be an aspect of “standing” in a court’s evaluation of the
statutory basis for a plaintiffs claim, this aspect o f standing for purposes of establishing
jurisdiction presents a low threshold. The plaintiff need only state a claim which is not so
“patently insubstantial” that the exercise of jurisdiction is not warranted. Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d
12

fo r Antitrust Standing, 86 Yale L. Rev. 809, 813 n. 11 (1977) (cited with approval in Associated
Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31).*12 Similarly, antitrust injury is distinct from Article I ll’s
injury requirement, and like antitrust standing, exceeds Article Ill’s requirements. See
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 (“[For] plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7
violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”). Thus, it
is error to confuse antitrust standing and injury with the constitutional doctrine of standing.
Even if antitrust standing and injury could be characterized as jurisdictional, Microsoft’s
arguments remain foreclosed by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The D.C. Circuit and “other courts

328, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see supra note 7; infra Section III.B. Where that minimal
requirement is met, the Court’s inquiry departs from the realm of jurisdiction and turns to the
merits of the case. See Best, 39 F.3d at 331; see supra note 7; infra Section III.B. The Court
observes that, if the doctrines of antitrust standing and injury are regarded as statutory
requirements, any potential attack on Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of those requirements in this case has
been waived by Defendant’s failure to raise this challenge to the merits in a timely manner. See
Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 151, 159 (1872) (“A party may waive any provision,
either of a contract or of a statute, intended for his benefit.”).
l2Berger and Bernstein are quite clear that antitrust standing is separate from both the
purely constitutional and the prudential aspects of the constitutional doctrine of standing:
Because the doctrine of antitrust standing reflects the special antitrust policy
considerations mentioned above, its focus is somewhat different from that of
standing doctrines familiar to constitutional lawyers. In constitutional litigation, the
initial standing question is whether the claimant is alleging a “particular, concrete
injury” that gives him a “personal stake in the outcome” of the adjudication, and
thereby meets the constitutional and prudential requirement of injury in fact.
Antitrustplaintiffs pass this constitutional threshold by alleging the statutorily
required “injury in [their] business or property.” Since such economic injury satisfies
the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, the antitrust standing injury
is not concerned with whether the plaintiff has constitutional standing.
Berger and Bernstein, 86 Yale L. Rev. at 813 n.l 1 (citations omitted) (alteration in Berger and
Bernstein) (emphasis added).
13

of appeals routinely apply law-of-the-case preclusion to questions of jurisdiction, and do so even
when the first decision regarding jurisdiction is less than explicit.” LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1394
(citations omitted).13 Seeming to ignore the holding in LaShawn A., Microsoft argues that its
standing argument is jurisdictional and therefore “cannot be waived.” Microsoft Reply at 4.
Microsoft uses the term “waiver” not in reference to the specific species of waiver doctrine that
is related to the “law-of-the-case” doctrine,14 but in its more general usage.15
Microsoft is correct, as a general proposition, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case cannot be conferred by the action or inaction of the parties, and therefore cannot be waived.

13The Court is aware that courts are not “bound by decisions on questions of jurisdiction
made sub silento in previous cases ‘when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional
issue’ to the Court.” LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1395 n.6 (quoting Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984) ^ ‘Pennhurst IP’)); accord United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (“Even as to our own judicial power or
jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is
not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a [previous] case where it was not questioned and
it was passed sub silentoP); IPAA II, 235 F.3d at 597. However, as in LaShawn A., that rule
“plainly has nothing to do with this [case]” because “[t]he quoted portion of Pennhurst II dealt
with the stare decisis effect of decisions in other cases, not the effect of earlier decisions by the
same appellate court in the same case.” LaShawn A,, 87 F.3d 1395 n.6 (emphasis in original).
14Waiver, as a doctrine related to law-of-the-case doctrine, dictates that a “legal decision
made at one stage of litigation, unchallenged on subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so
existed [governs] future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived
the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739 (quoting
Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d243, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1987))
(alteration in Crocker). This species of the waiver doctrine presents an “analytically distinct
principle: unlike law-of-the-case doctrine proper, this bar on raising issues omitted from prior
appeals .. . does not involve any previous appellate court decision on the barred issue.” Id. As
articulated by the Court of Appeals in Crocker, the doctrine of waiver is not a precise fit with the
posture of this case, at least while the case is pending at the district court level. As noted above,
Microsoft’s “waiver” argument does not appear to rely upon this species of waiver.
15As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, to waive is “[t]o abandon, renounce, or
surrender (a claim, privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1574 (7th ed. 1999). Waiver is defined as the “voluntary relinquishment or
abandonment — express or implied — of a legal right or advantage.” Id.
14

Insurance Corp. o f Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982). Nevertheless, Microsoft’s recital of this fundamental tenet of federal jurisprudence does
not advance its position. The point is not that this Court cannot address jurisdiction because that
issue has been waived, but that the Court cannot now revisit the issue of jurisdiction by operation
of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule. In order for the law-of-the-case doctrine
and the mandate rule to apply in this context, specifically to the jurisdictional issue, the Court
must conclude that the issue was addressed and resolved by the Court of Appeals “explicitly or
by necessary implication.” LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1394 (quoting Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739).
Microsoft asserts in its reply memorandum that the mandate rule, and presumably its weaker
version, the law-of-the-case doctrine, do not foreclose consideration of any of the issues raised in
its motion because ‘“ there can be no law of the case’ as to issues that were not decided by the
Court of Appeals.” Microsoft Reply at 4. Implying that the Court of Appeals has not addressed
the jurisdictional issues raised in Microsoft’s motion to dismiss, Microsoft ignores the
necessarily implicit holding of the Court of Appeals.
This Court is loathe to presume, as Microsoft does, that the Court of Appeals did not
consider the jurisdictional issue of standing. Rather, because Article III courts are required to
satisfy themselves of their own jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of a case. Steel Co. v.
Citizens fo r a Better E n v’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-96 (1998), it seems far more appropriate to conclude,
“by necessary implication,” LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1394 (quoting Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739), that
the threshold issue of constitutional standing, as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, was
resolved prior to the Court of Appeals’ evaluation of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. As
explained by the Supreme Court:
every federal appellate court has a special obligation to “satisfy itself not only of its
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own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,” even
though the parties are prepared to concede it. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. T il, 244
(1934). SeeJuidicev. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331-332 (1977) (standing). “And if the
record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice
the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. [When the lower
federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits
but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining
the suit.” United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936) (footnotes omitted).
Arizonans fo r Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997) (quoting Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)) (alteration in original); Steel Co., 523
U.S. at 95 (quoting Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 73). The rule that the federal
courts, at every level, are obliged to inquire of their own jurisdiction “is inflexible and without
exception.” Insurance Corp. o f Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co.
v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).16 Any other rule would permit court pronouncement on the
merits of a case in the absence of jurisdiction-action which is, “by very definition . . . ultra
vires.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101-02. Thus, “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the
courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574,583 (1999).
Paying little heed to the Court of Appeals’ obligation to inquire both into its own
jurisdiction, as well as the jurisdiction of the District Court, Microsoft argues, in effect, that
because this case was consolidated with United States v. Microsoft Corp. and “no one focused on

16The Insurance Corp. o f Ireland Court stated:
[A] court, including an appellate court, will raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
on its own motion. “[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial
power of the United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires this
court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate
power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such
jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.”
456 U.S. at 702 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R., I l l U.S. at 382) (second alteration in
Insurance Corp. o f Ireland).
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this issue until the paths [of the two cases] diverged on November the 6th, 2001,” there can be no
presumption that the Court of Appeals satisfied itself of its own jurisdiction prior to addressing
the merits. Remedy Hrg. Tr. at 7333. Microsoft underestimates the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, noted at the outset of its review of the two cases that “[t]he
action against Microsoft arose pursuant to a complaint filed by the United States and separate
complaints filed by individual States,” 253 F.3d at 45, and identified the matter before it as a
“consolidated appeal,” id. at 48. Thereafter, the appellate court issued a mandate to this Court
remanding “the cases . . . with instructions, all in accordance with the opinion for the Court filed
herein this date.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 00-5212 and 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. June
28, 2001).17 This Court will not presume, as Microsoft suggests, that due to the presence of the
United States as a plaintiff in one of the consolidated cases, the Court of Appeals ignored its
obligation to consider its basis for jurisdiction in both cases. To the contrary, this Court takes the
view, “by necessary implication,” LaShawn A ., 87 F.3d at 1394 (quoting Crocker, 49 F.3d at
739), that the Court of Appeals considered the sufficiency of its jurisdiction and determined sub
silento that it possessed jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.18

17The mandate provides in full:
These causes came on to be heard on the record on appeal from the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia and were argued by counsel. On
consideration thereof, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, by the Court, that the judgment of the
District Court appealed from in these causes is hereby affirmed in part, reversed in
part, remanded in part, the final judgment embodying the remedial order is vacated
in full and the cases are remanded with instructions, all in accordance with the
opinion for the Court filed herein this date.
Microsoft, Nos. 00-5212 and 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 2001).
l8The holding in 1PAA II does not detract from this conclusion, as that case is plainly
distinguishable on the facts. In that case, on the first appeal, IPAA I, the Court of Appeals
addressed two cases consolidated at the District Court level, IPAA v. Babbitt and Samedan Oil
17

3.

General Building Contractors A ss’n v. Pennsylvania: footnote 22

In a similar vein, in its reply, Microsoft boldly applies to the facts of this case the
proposition that a court need not consider the standing of other plaintiffs until they “seek or
obtain relief different from that obtained by the plaintiff with [unquestioned] standing.”
Microsoft Reply at 3. Applying this proposition, Microsoft reasserts its earlier contention that
the Court of Appeals had no “occasion to discuss the several factors distinguishing the States’
rights to equitable relief under federal or state law from that of the United States.” Microsoft
Mem. at 7; accord Microsoft Reply at 3-4. Microsoft bases its argument in this regard on a
footnote in General Building Contractors Ass ’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). In
General Building Contractors, the Supreme Court “decline[d]” to reach the issue of whether one
of the plaintiffs, Pennsylvania, had satisfied Article I ll’s standing requirements based on the
rationale that while the standing of the other plaintiffs in that case remained unchallenged “the

Corp. v. Deer, and reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on two discrete
issues. IPAA II, 235 F.3d at 592. On its second appeal, IPAA
argue[d] that its claim originally included a challenge to the [agency decision
challenged by the companion case, Samedan Oil Corp. v. Deer,] and that in IPAA I
[the Court of Appeals] reversed the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment against IPAA in its challenge to [the agency decision in] Samedan. IPAA
suggested that] the District Court ignored this mandate by refusing to enter a
judgment in its favor and subsequently dismissing its complaint. According to
IPAA, by reopening questions already determined in earlier phases of this litigation,
the District Court violated the mandate rule.
IPAA II, 235 F.3d. at 594. In response to these arguments, applying the rule in LaShawn A., the
Court of Appeals held that the mandate rule did not foreclose the District Court’s consideration
o f jurisdiction because “the question of whether IPAA had challenged [the agency decision in
Samedan] was not before us, nor decided by us, even by implication.” Id. at 597. In stark
contrast, in this case, the Court of Appeals heard an appeal by Defendant from all adverse rulings
following a full trial on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the issuance of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the imposition of a remedy. Given the appellate court’s unfaltering
obligation to inquire about its own jurisdiction, Defendant cannot argue that the issue of
jurisdiction was somehow not before the Court when it heard Microsoft’s appeal from Judge
Jackson’s final judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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District Court possessed Art. Ill jurisdiction to entertain those common issues presented by all
plaintiffs.” Id. at 402 n.22. The Supreme Court further declined to address the issue that
Pennsylvania had “sought attorney’s fees in its own right” on the grounds that the Court’s
“judgment has removed the basis for such an award against petitioners until such time as
Pennsylvania can again assert status as a prevailing party.” Id. The Court closed its refusal to
address Pennsylvania’s standing with the statement that it need not do so “[ujntil Pennsylvania
obtains relief different from that sought by plaintiffs whose standing has not been questioned.”
Id.
The Supreme Court’s statement in footnote 22 of General Building Contractors need not
be read as an aberration or an exception to the law of standing. The Court’s discussion in
footnote 22 in General Building Contractors was concerned only with whether a particular
plaintiff had satisfied Article Ill’s standing requirements, id., meaning the Constitution’s “case or
controversy” requirement, which is the minimum necessary for the Court to exert jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.19 Logically, where there exists in the
same suit a particular plaintiff presenting questions common to other plaintiffs, and that plaintiff

19It is not clear whether, in referencing “Article III jurisdiction to entertain those common
issues presented by all plaintiffs,” General Building Contractors, 458 U.S. at 402 n.22, the term
“Article III jurisdiction” was intended to encompass “both constitutional limitations on federalcourt jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. Erring on
the side of caution, the Court will presume for purposes of its analysis in this case that the
inquiry into “Article III jurisdiction” in this context includes both constitutional and prudential
considerations. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51 (“The Art. Ill doctrine that requires a litigant to
have ‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these
doctrines.. . . Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise
o f federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s
legal rights, the rale barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed
in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the
zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”).
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clearly satisfies the standing requirement, a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction, as a
constitutional matter, to hear and adjudicate that plaintiffs case or controversy. Therefore, a
court need not inquire separately of the standing of all of the plaintiffs so long as the “case or
controversy” presented by all of the plaintiffs remains unitary. Understanding the basis for this
rule, it is readily apparent that Defendant’s reliance upon footnote 22 in General Building
Contractors is misplaced.
Unlike General Building Contractors, where plaintiffs with unquestionable Article III
standing were parties to the same case as a single plaintiff with questionable Article III standing,
the United States-the entity with unquestionable standing-has never been a party to this case.
The separate cases of United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, and State o f New York, et
al. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233, were consolidated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(a). Rule 42(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “ [w]hen actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the co u rt. . . it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). As this Court previously observed,
consolidation “does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or
make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233, Order at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2002) (Order deconsolidating United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, and State o f New York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 981233) (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§ 734, the predecessor statute to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a))); accord IPAA II, 235 F.3d at 595-96
(noting that despite consolidation, even where parties “were represented by the same counsel and
filed a joint brief on appeal, their individual cases were not somehow merged into one—they
20

remained separate and distinct”). Rather, consolidation is a purely ministerial act which, as the
record in these cases reflects, relieves the parties and the Court of the burden of duplicative
pleadings and Court orders.
Although Microsoft would have the Court believe that the presence of entirely separate
cases is a minor point, Microsoft Reply at 4, because the doctrine of Article III standing is simply
a way of capturing the Constitution’s “case or controversy” limitation on federal court
jurisdiction and the prudential considerations related thereto, the fact that the claims were
brought in separate “cases” would seem to impact substantially upon any discussion of Article III
standing. Furthermore, although the two cases presented common issues of law, State o f New
York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp. also presented issues which were wholly absent from United
States v. Microsoft Corp., namely the claims of each individual state under the corresponding
provisions of state law. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals assumed jurisdiction
over these separate state law claims. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 46 (“Our judgment extends to the
District Court’s findings with respect to the state law counterparts of the plaintiffs’ Sherman Act
claims.”); Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (“[T]he evidence in the record proving violations of
the Sherman Act also satisfies the elements of analogous causes of action arising under the laws
o f each plaintiff state. For this reason, and for others stated below, the Court holds Microsoft
liable under those particular state laws as well.”). Finally, even assuming that the separateness of
the two cases does not render inapplicable footnote 22 of General Building Contractors, the
language of General Building Contractors does not afford Microsoft a basis upon which to
challenge Plaintiffs’ establishment of antitrust standing and injury because these are nonjurisdictional issues which go to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleadings and/or the evidence
adduced at trial.
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To the extent that Defendant’s motion invokes the concepts of antitrust standing and
injury, it reads as a challenge to Plaintiffs’ legal entitlement to seek a remedy following the Court
o f Appeals’ finding of liability in this case. Seeming to ignore the mandate of the Court of
Appeals, Microsoft shrugs off the impact of the appellate court’s opinion. Specifically,
Microsoft asserts that the failure of the Court of Appeals to “distinguish[] the States’ rights to
equitable relief under federal or state law from that of the United States” somehow invites a new
analysis of the sufficiency of the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint and the proof provided at
trial. Microsoft Mem. at 7; accord Microsoft Mem. at 13; Microsoft Reply at 3. While it is
difficult to quibble with the notion that the Court of Appeals may not have foreseen the
divergence of United States v. Microsoft Corp. from State o f New York, et al. v. Microsoft Corp.,
nothing in the appellate opinion undermines Plaintiffs’ ability to proceed to a judicial
determination on the issue of remedy. Notwithstanding this fact, with little more than a passing
reference, Microsoft implores this Court to ignore the explicit findings of liability and presume
that the Court of Appeals simply overlooked the fact that it was presented with two separate and
distinct cases which sought relief on separate statutory grounds. Having failed to identify any
legitimate basis for a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings or the evidence adduced at
trial, Microsoft’s arguments with regard to antitrust standing and injury are improper given the
procedural posture of the case.
B.

Parens Patriae Standing
Another of Microsoft’s primary arguments focuses upon yet another species of

“standing”-/iare«5 patriae standing. The doctrine o f parens patriae standing20 allows states to

2°“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country.’” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1003 (5th ed. 1979)).
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bring suit on behalf of their citizens in certain circumstances by asserting an injury to a “quasi
sovereign interest.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. Quasi-sovereign interest “is a judicial construct that
does not lend itself to simple or exact definition.” Id. For a state to bring suit in its parens
patriae capacity in federal court, it must establish that its parens patriae interest satisfies the
constitutional minimum of Article III standing and is a proper basis for suit under the applicable
statute. See Connecticut v. Physicians Health Services o f Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d
Cir. 2002) (addressing the Article III and statutory components ofparens patriae standing
separately); accord Maryland People’s Counsel, 760 F.2d at 321 (holding that the bar on suits by
states as parens patriae against the federal government arises from the “prudential component”
of standing, which Congress may override, rather than a deficiency in the ‘“ core component’ of
the constitutional doctrine of standing”). These inquiries are separate such that the presence or
absence of a statute authorizing parens patriae standing does affect whether Article Ill’s standing
requirements have been satisfied. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 316
(3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). O f course, if either Article III standing or statutory standing is absent,
the Court is without subject mater jurisdiction over the claim. Insurance Corp. o f Ireland, 456
U.S. at 702 (“Subject matter jurisdiction . . . is an Article HI as well as a statutory requirement; it
functions as a restriction on federal power and contributes to the characterization of the federal
sovereign.”).
At the outset of this discussion, it bears repeating that the Supreme Court has “sharply
distinguished the jurisdictional question presented for immediate resolution from the merits
questions unavoidably pretermitted for determination at later stages of the litigation.” Payne v.
District o f Columbia, 559 F.2d 809, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see supra note 7. Only where the
federal claims are found to be “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the
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Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy
within the jurisdiction of the District Court” is dismissal for want of jurisdiction appropriate.
Hagans, 415 U.S. at 543 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County o f Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 66667 (1974)); accord Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70-71
(1978); Best, 39F .3dat330. Where the claims do not meet this insubstantiality standard,
dismissal of the claims for “failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the
merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Hagans, 415 U.S. at 542. Applying
those principles to this case and Microsoft’s motion, the Court can readily satisfy itself that
Plaintiffs’ claims are not frivolous. Therefore, as illustrated by the discussion below,
substantially all o f the Court’s inquiry into Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of antitmst injury, antitrust
standing, and parens patriae standing is an inquiry on the merits.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, whether jurisdictional or otherwise, as discussed in detail
above, the law-of-the-case doctrine forecloses consideration by this Court of matters which were
addressed at an earlier stage in proceedings, either explicitly or implicitly, by the District Court
and Court of Appeals. LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1393-95; Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739-40. It scarcely
bears repeating that, in order to find and affirm liability, the District Court and the Court of
Appeals necessarily concluded that Plaintiffs’ capacity to bring suit as parens patriae was
satisfied on all fronts. Nonetheless, in the interest of thoroughness, the Court will address the
legal basis for Microsoft’s arguments with regard to parens patriae standing.
1.

Article III Injury

Injury in a suit brought by a state in its parens patriae capacity rests upon “sufficiently
severe and generalized” harm to the welfare of that state’s citizens, rather than harm to the
proprietary interest of the state. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675
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(D.C. Cir. 1976). A state’s concern for the “continuing prosperity of [its] econom[y]” falls
within the “recognized category of quasi-sovereign interests” which justify parens patriae
standing. Id. at 674; accord Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 (“[A] state has a quasi-sovereign interest in
the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in general.”). In this case,
Plaintiffs alleged and the District Court found that “in each of the plaintiff states, Microsoft’s
anticompetitive conduct has significantly hampered competition.” Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at
5 5.21 This finding survived the Court of Appeals’ ruling inasmuch as the appellate court affirmed
the District Court’s other findings of liability for violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and
the appropriate state law counterparts. Therefore, the Court has little doubt that Plaintiffs have
satisfied Article I ll’s threshold standing requirement.22
2.

Statutory Requirements

Microsoft’s argument extends beyond the Article III minimum to the issue of whether
Plaintiffs have satisfied the antitrust standing and injury requirements for a parens patriae claim
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. In this regard, Microsoft posits that Plaintiffs have not
satisfied the requirements for a parens patriae claim under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.
It is beyond dispute that federal antitrust law, specifically Section 16 of the Clayton Act,

21Although the District Court reached this conclusion in the context of a discussion of
intrastate injury in conjunction with its analysis of certain state laws, Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at
55, the conclusion is nonetheless applicable to the Plaintiff States’ claims under federal law.
22For Article III purposes, the breadth of the injury among the several states is not
relevant, as limitations on claims for broadly felt injuries are not constitutionally based. See
Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (holding that Article III is satisfied by an allegation of a “distinct and
palpable injury . . . even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants”
because Congress may “grant[] a right of action” and provide standing to “invoke the general
public interest in support of their claim”). Such limitations are prudential and thus, are subject
to alteration by Congress. Id.
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provides statutory authorization for claims brought by a state in its capacity as parens patriae.
See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945); see also California v. American
Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (holding in a suit brought by California in its parens patriae
capacity that divestiture is a form of injunctive relief within the meaning of Section 16 of the
Clayton Act); Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 258-66 (acknowledging that parens patriae standing will
support a claim for injunctive relief pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, but holding that
parens patriae standing is not available for claims for damages brought pursuant to Section 4 o f
the Clayton Act). An inquiry into the statutory requisites for a Section 16 claim for injunctive
relief, when such a claim is brought by a state in its parens patriae capacity, necessarily invokes
the concepts of antitrust standing and injury, discussed above, as these concepts further refine the
parameters of an appropriate interest for purposes of an antitrust suit. Thus, the Court’s analysis
of Defendant’s statutory argument relies upon antitrust jurisprudence as well as parens patriae
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court candidly acknowledged in Kleppe that “[t]he nature of the economic
or welfare interest necessary to justify state standing is one of the more obscure issues with
which [the Court] must deal.” Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 674. Seizing upon this obscurity, Microsoft
insists that in order to obtain any remedy in these proceedings, Plaintiffs must now establish that
they “are seeking to remedy some state-specific injury.” Microsoft Mem. at 17. In this regard,
Microsoft first takes the position that the Litigating States must distinguish the injury to their
citizenry from the injury “shared in common by all citizens of the United States.” Id. at 18.
From this proposition, Microsoft drifts into the assertion that the injuries identified by the
Plaintiff States have been suffered only by “specific businesses or other discrete groups of
constituents,” namely Microsoft competitors. Id. at 20-21.
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Microsoft’s initial assertion is without support in the law.23 While certainly a state
alleging injury must establish that its own citizens have suffered some injury, none of the cases
cited by Microsoft hold that parens patriae standing should be denied where the injury is felt by
the citizens of the other states. See Snapp, 458 U.S. 592; Hawaii, 405 U.S. 251; Georgia, 324
U.S. 439; see also New York Amicus Br. at 7-17; Multi-State Amici Br. at 2-11; United States
Amicus Br. at 10-15. Indeed, such a requirement is undermined by the Supreme Court’s
acknowledgment in Hawaii v. Standard Oil that “the United States Government, the
governments o f each State, and any individual threatened with injury by an antitrust violation
may all sue for injunctive relief against violations of the antitrust laws, and . . . they may
theoretically do so simultaneously against the same persons for the same violations . . . .”
Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 261. Moreover, if the Court agreed with Microsoft’s reading of the law, a
state’s right to bring suit as parens patriae under the Clayton Act would be nullified where the
harm sweeps broadly across the states. In such a situation, the individual states would have to
rely solely upon the federal government to bring suit to cease the harm. This result runs contrary
to the well-established principle that “[sjuits by a State, parens patriae, have long been
recognized. There is no apparent reason why those suits should be excluded from the purview o f
the anti-trust acts.” Georgia, 324 U.S. at 447 (italics added).
With regard to Microsoft’s latter assertion, that the claimed injuries are insufficient
because they are based upon too discrete a group of constituents, this claim is flatly contradicted
by the District Court’s conclusion that “significant adverse effect on competition within the state
. . . is manifestly proven by the facts presented here . . . . [M illions of citizens of, and hundreds,

23Microsoft concedes that the term “state-specific injury” is a “Microsoft” term, which
does not appear in the case law. Remedy Hrg. Tr. at 7359.
27

if not thousands, of enterprises in each of the United States and the District of Columbia utilize
PCs running on Microsoft software.” Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 55. This conclusion was not
altered on appeal. See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34. It cannot, therefore, be said that this is
a case where the “primary thrust of an alleged wrong is injury to a narrowly limited class of
individuals, and the harm to the economy as a whole is insignificant by comparison.” Kleppe,
533 F.2d at 675. At a minimum, this is a case where “the direct impact of the alleged wrong [is]
felt by a substantial majority, though less than all, of the state’s citizens, so that the suit can be
said to be for the benefit of the public.” Id. As a result, the Court finds Microsoft’s parens
patriae arguments, notwithstanding their untimeliness and preemption by the law of the case and
the mandate in this case, to be insufficient to warrant the “dismissal” of Plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief.
3.

Collateral Attack

Defendant offers a third argument against parens patriae standing by Plaintiffs in this
case, asserting broadly that to allow Plaintiffs to obtain relief would “undermine the enforcement
scheme embodied in the Sherman and Clayton Acts.” Microsoft Mem. at 22. In this regard,
Microsoft characterizes Plaintiffs’ request for a remedy in this case as a “collateral attack” on the
proposed settlement between the United States and Microsoft in United States v. Microsoft Corp.
Remedy Hrg. Tr. at 7371. As Plaintiffs and the United States point out, in crafting this
argument, Microsoft quotes selectively from a number of cases with the effect of
mischaracterizing their holdings. Compare Microsoft Mem. at 23-24 (citing Kleppe, 533 F.2d at
676-77, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)), with States Opp’n at 15 and
United States Amicus Br. at 13-14. The Court finds this tactic unpersuasive. Microsoft
acknowledges that the cases it cites are clearly distinguishable on their facts because Plaintiffs’
28

suit is not against the federal govemment-the defendant in those cases-but nonetheless insists
that the case law reflects a “policy . . . relevan[t] to this case in the court’s exercise of its
discretion.” Remedy Hrg. Tr. at 7371. If, in fact, this line of cases may be read to impact at all
upon this Court’s discretion, then the cases, even as argued by Microsoft, do not counsel in favor
of a blanket dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction. To the contrary, the Court may
better consider the merits of this argument in conjunction with its consideration of the merits of
Plaintiffs’ proposed remedy and the exercise of its equitable powers.
Further supplementing its parens patriae arguments and its more general policy
arguments, Microsoft relies upon a second line of cases for the proposition that a state cannot
“impos[e] its own policy choice on neighboring States.” Microsoft Mem. at 24 (quoting BMW o f
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996)). Microsoft argues that BMW and similar cases
“demonstrate why parens patriae standing under Section 16 of the Clayton Act must be
restricted to claims based on discrimination among States or on some distinctive local impact.”
Microsoft Mem. at 25. Once again, the Court finds Microsoft’s argument in this regard to be
unpersuasive, as it is largely, if not entirely, unsupported by the case law. The holding in
BM W is based upon principles of “state sovereignty and comity,” rather than federalism concerns
as Microsoft’s motion implies. BMW, 517 U.S. at 572. More importantly, BMW and the other
cases cited by Microsoft concerned suits under state law, rather than suits for redress under
federal law, like the instant one.24 The mere presence of state law claims in this suit does not
detract from the presence of the federal claims and the relief afforded thereunder. Thus, the

24Indeed, BM W concerned an attempt by Alabama to “impose economic sanctions on
violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”
517 U.S. at 572.
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Court finds Microsoft’s reliance upon BM W and similar cases to be unpersuasive.
C.

Other Arguments
Having disposed of Microsoft’s more detailed arguments involving antitrust standing,

antitrust injury, and parens patriae standing, the Court turns to a series of arguments raised in
summary form by Microsoft in its memorandum in support of dismissal. Once again, the Court
takes the position that because liability in this case has been established and affirmed on appeal,
the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes all of the following arguments, which are attacks upon the
Litigating States’ ability to bring suit and to obtain a judgment in their favor. Nonetheless, for
the sake of completeness, the Court touches briefly upon the legal merits of Microsoft’s
remaining arguments.
1.

Appointments and Take Care Clauses

Microsoft argues that to permit the Litigating States to seek relief distinct from that
agreed upon and submitted to the Court for approval by Microsoft and the United States “would
raise serious constitutional questions under both the Appointments and Take Care Clauses of
Article II.” Microsoft Mem. at 27. The “Appointments Clause,” appearing in Article II, Section
2 of the Constitution, provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint. . . Officers of the United States.” U.S. Const, art. II,
§ 2. Arguing that the Appointments Clause enables compliance with the Constitution’s mandate
that the President “take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const, art. II, § 3,
Defendant insists that the Litigating States’ request for equitable relief “impermissibly
interfere^]” with the President’s duties in this regard. Microsoft Mem. at 27. As the United
States points out in its amicus brief, Microsoft’s argument in this vein can be viewed as an attack
not only on actions by private parties pursuant to Section 16, but on actions pursuant to “Sections
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4 (damage actions by private parties for antitrust violations) and 4C (stateparens patriae suits
for money damages for violations of the Sherman Act)” on the grounds that the actions
authorized thereunder are inconsistent with Article n. United States Amicus Br. at 19. Not
surprisingly, this ambitious argument and the ensuing conclusion that Plaintiffs’ claims should
be precluded are not directly supported by the case law cited by Microsoft in its memorandum.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress is without authority to
mandate that state officers, unsupervised by the President, perform administrative functions in
conjunction with the execution of federal law); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding
the Appointments Clause was not violated when Congress empowered a court to appoint
prosecutorial officers pursuant to the independent counsel provisions o f the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 etseq.)’, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976)
(holding that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§431 etseq., which vests
the Federal Election Commission with primary and substantial responsibility for administering
the Act, violates Article II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution because “such functions may be
discharged only by persons who are ‘Officers of the United States’ within the language of that
section” of the Constitution). Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that the
rights of private plaintiffs pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act are meant to “supplement]
Government enforcement of the antitrust laws.” United States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514, 518
(1954). “[Pjrivate and public [antitrust] actions were designed to be cumulative, not mutually
exclusive.” Id.25 Accordingly, the Court rejects Microsoft’s Appointments Clause and Take

25Microsoft quotes selectively from the language in Borden to imply that suits by the
federal government are intended to supersede suits by private litigants, including states in their
parens patriae capacity. Microsoft Mem. at 15. The holding in Borden does not go that far. To
the contrary, Borden holds only that suits by private litigants resulting in an injunction do not
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Care Clause arguments.
2.

Supremacy Clause

Microsoft raises an additional concern for the supremacy of federal enforcement by
relying upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000). Likening a Department of Transportation regulation to the proposed settlement in United
States v. Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Mem. at 32, Microsoft contends that the Litigating States’
continuing request for equitable relief “frustrate[s] the objectives of the Executive Branch in
carrying out its special responsibilities to enforce federal law.” Id. at 33. Applying similar
reasoning, Microsoft cites to Crosby v. N a t’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000)
(holding that a Massachusetts law “restricting the authority o f its agencies to purchase goods or
services from companies doing business with Burma is invalid under the Supremacy Clause of
the National Constitution owing to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives”) and
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27 (1996) (holding that a “federal statute that permits
national banks to sell insurance in small towns pre-empts a state statute that forbids them to do
so” via application o f the Supremacy Clause). Id. Based on these cases, Microsoft attempts to
argue that the Supremacy Clause forbids federal action by the Litigating States that is separate
from the action of the United States.
Each of the cases Microsoft cites is readily distinguishable on its facts. Moreover,
Microsoft’s arguments on this point ignore the fact that states have long been permitted to sue
under the federal antitrust laws in their capacity as parens patriae,26 See Georgia, 324 U.S. at

preclude suits by the United States for injunctive relief. Borden, 347 U.S. at 518-20.
26Some antitmst statutes expressly encourage state litigation as parens patriae. See, e.g.,
15U.S.C. § 15c.
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447 (“Suits by a State, parens patriae, have long been recognized. There is no apparent reason
why those suits should be excluded from the purview of the anti-trust acts.”) (italics added).
Given the well-established rights of the states to sue as parens patriae under federal antitrust law,
id., along with the similarly well-established right of the states to supplement federal antitrust
regulation with state antitrust laws, see California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02
(1989), in the absence of more persuasive case law to the contrary, it is antithetical to conclude
that a state action seeking relief distinct from the relief sought in a federal action violates the
Supremacy Clause. As a result, the Court finds Microsoft’s Supremacy Clause argument to be
without merit.
3.

United States v. Microsoft Corp.

Microsoft makes a series of arguments based upon the existence of a proposed final
judgment in United States v. Microsoft Corp. In essence, Microsoft argues that consideration of
the proposed consent decree submitted by the parties in United States v. Microsoft Corp.-the
“ [Second] Revised Proposed Final Judgment”-is appropriate only in that case and not in this one.
Microsoft Mem. at 38-39. Without disputing this somewhat general and inoffensive proposition,
the Court fails to see how it impacts upon these proceedings. That Microsoft has chosen to offer
as its proposed remedy in this case a remedy which is identical to the “[Second] Revised
Proposed Final Judgment” submitted in United States v. Microsoft Corp. does not bear upon this
Court’s discretion to order an appropriate remedy for antitrust violations pursuant to Section 16.
It borders on frivolous to argue that Microsoft’s decision to submit the same proposed remedy in
both cases would have such an effect and thereby enable Microsoft to bootstrap itself into an
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argument for preclusion.27
4.

Fifth Amendment Takings Clause

Finally, Microsoft argues that “several aspects” of the Litigating States’ proposed remedy
“raise substantial issues under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and those issues
militate against awarding such relief under traditional equitable principles.” Microsoft Mem. at
39-40. Microsoft’s argument in this regard is directed at the specifics of the Litigating States’
remedy proposal. Because Microsoft seeks outright dismissal of the Litigating States’ request
for equitable relief, this side-trip into the merits of select portions o f Plaintiffs’ proposal seems, if
not contradictory to Microsoft’s arguments, then at least premature. Furthermore, Microsoft’s
argument regarding “several aspects” of the Litigating States’ remedy proposal is overly vague,
failing to cite to any specific provision in the Litigating States’ remedy proposal. Id. at 39-41.
As consideration of the “takings” issue raised by Microsoft would be far more appropriate in the
context of a substantive evaluation of the competing remedy proposals, the Court defers its
discussion of this argument, if necessary at all, until it addresses the merits of the competing
proposals.
IV. CONCLUSION
This case has been unique from its inception and has continued to distinguish itself from
its predecessors throughout its pendency. The Court’s Opinion in response to Microsoft’s
“motion to dismiss” reinforces that distinction in that the Court’s holding in this instance is a
product, primarily, of the unusual procedural posture of this case. Thus, the Court observes that

27As no judgment has been entered in United States v. Microsoft Corp., at this point, the
Court need not address Microsoft’s argument that entry of a final judgment in United States v.
Microsoft Corp. constitutes res judicata such that the Litigating States cannot obtain relief in
their own case.
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the legal issues addressed herein may prove appropriate for consideration in a subsequent case
where they are not hobbled at the outset by the existing law of the case.28
Nonetheless, in this particular case, for the reasons set forth in detail above, the Court
concludes that Microsoft’s motion is without merit and must be denied. In so concluding, the
Court rejects Microsoft’s legal arguments on their merits, as well as Microsoft’s contention that
these legal arguments are not foreclosed by the law of this case. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

June 12, 2002

_____________________________
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge

28The policy arguments raised in the United States’ amicus brief, and to a lesser extent in
Microsoft’s memoranda, regarding the Court’s exercise of its equitable powers, although not
specifically addressed in this Memorandum Opinion, have not passed unnoticed. Once again,
however, given the unique posture of this case, including specific instructions from the Court of
Appeals to “afford[] the parties a proper opportunity to be heard” on the issue of remedy,
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 105, the Court does not regard these arguments as sufficient to justify the
“dismissal” of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. The Court has yet to determine whether
these policy considerations will inform the Court’s exercise of its equitable powers in devising a
remedy in this case.
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Introduction
The States o f Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,

Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington,
W isconsin and the Commonwealth o f Kentucky (hereinafter “Amici States”), by and
through their Attorneys General, submit this Memorandum as Amici Curiae to
demonstrate that the States have broad parens patriae authority to proceed under Section
16 o f the Clayton Act, even when the federal government has proposed to settle a case.
Congress has granted the States clear authority to proceed independently under Section
16, despite the fact that the federal government has chosen not to act, has proposed to
settle a case, has in fact settled a case, or has taken the matter to trial. The Amici States
take no position in this Memorandum on the merits o f the underlying action.
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IL

Interest of the Amici States
The Attorneys General o f the Amici States are charged by law with the duty o f

enforcing both state and federal antitrust laws, including Section 16 o f the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 26 (“Section 16”). The Amici States play a major role in federal antitrust
enforcement.
In particular, with respect to Section 16, State Attorneys General for many years
have exercised the common law parens patriae authority o f the States to protect their
respective States’ economies and to preserve the health, comfort, and economic welfare
o f their citizens. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Pursuant to this authority, States have challenged conduct under Section 16 that affects
their States separately1 as well as collectively.2 They have utilized this power in actions
in conjunction with the federal government,3 when the federal government has elected not
to act,4 and after the federal government has reached a settlement deemed insufficient to
protect their States’ economies.5 Since the passage o f the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act o f 1976, Pub. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383(1976) (“Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act”), the States, in their proprietary capacity and as parens patriae on behalf o f their
consumers, have brought numerous antitrust actions to enjoin further violations o f federal

1See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. o f California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Pennsylvania R. Co., supra.

2See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
3See New York ex rel. Abrams v. Primestar Partners, L.P., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ^70,403 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 1993).

4See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., supra.
5See California v. American Stores, 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
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and state law and to recover damages resulting from those violations. See, e.g., New York
v. R e e b o k ln t’l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), a ff’d, 96 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996);
Pennsylvania v. Playmobil USA, Inc., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 71,215 (M.D. Pa. Dec.
15, 1995); Maryland v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 69,743
(D. Md. Jan. 15, 1992); In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456
(D. Md. 1987); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 605 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md.
1984).
The Amici States, thus, play a major role in national antitrust enforcement and
have a vital interest in ensuring that federal antitrust law is interpreted in accord with the
intent o f Congress and prior court decisions to prevent the erosion o f their parens patriae
authority.
Additionally, the States were actively protecting the nation’s system o f free
enterprise before the federal government had antitrust enforcement authority. Twentyone States had adopted their own antitrust statutes before the Sherman Act was enacted.
See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 n. 4 (1989). M any o f these
statutes now include explicit provisions requiring them to be construed in accordance
with federal court decisions interpreting corresponding provisions o f the federal laws.6
The Amici States, therefore, have a substantial interest in ensuring that federal courts

6 See, e.g., Md.. Com. Law Code Aim. § 110292(a)(2)(2000) (“It is the intent o f the General Assembly that,
in construing this subtitle, the courts be guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the
various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters”); 9 Vermont Statutes Annotated Sec. 2453
(the courts o f Vermont will be guided by the construction o f similar terms contained in federal law as from
time to time amended by the courts o f the United States).
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apply the antitrust laws in a manner consistent with underlying congressional intent, court
decisions, and sound public policy.
The Amici States support the position o f the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts,
the District o f Columbia and the States o f California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Utah and West Virginia that States have the right to seek injunctive relief
under §16 o f the Clayton Act independent o f the actions o f the United States.

III.

The States have Broad Parens Patriae Authority to Seek Injunctive Relief
Section 16 provides that “ [a]ny person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have

injunctive relief, in any court o f the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation o f the antitrust laws....” This remedy
was created “not merely to provide private relief, b u t ... to serve as well the high purpose
o f enforcing the antitrust laws.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 130-31 (1969). Both under Section 16 o f the Clayton Act, and under the later HartScott-Rodino Act, Congress has made clear its intent to allow States to enforce the
federal antitrust laws by seeking injunctive relief unfettered by considerations o f the
activities of the federal government.

A.

Early U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Unequivocally
Recognized the States’ Authority to Proceed Independent of
the Federal Government

In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), the Supreme Court held
that the State o f Georgia was entitled to seek injunctive relief under federal antitrust law
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to protect interests beyond that State’s proprietary interests. The Court wrote that
Georgia’s interests “embrace the so-called ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests” o f the State to
obtain relief from an antitrust violation that “has injured the economy o f Georgia.” 324
U.S. at 447-48 (citations omitted). Georgia’s quasi-sovereign interests in protecting its
economy from the effects o f antitrust violations “are matters o f grave public concern in
which Georgia has an interest apart from that o f particular individuals who may be
affected. Georgia’s interest is not remote; it is immediate.” 324 U.S. at 450-51. In
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. o f California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Supreme Court again
affirmed the importance o f the States’ common law role as parens patriae.
In Pennsylvania R. Co., the Court recognized that the States’ common law parens
patriae authority exists independent o f the power o f the United States. Although criminal
enforcement o f the federal antitrust laws “has been entrusted exclusively to the federal
government,” 324 U.S. at 447, the Supreme Court held that
[WJhen it came to other sanctions Congress follow ed a different course and
authorized civil suits not only by the United States but by other persons as well.
And we find no indication that, when Congress fashioned these remedies, it
restricted the States to suits to protect their proprietary interest. Suits by a State,
parens patriae have long been recognized. There is no apparent reason why those
suits should be excluded from the purview o f the anti-trust acts.
Id. (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
That Congress intended to permit States to seek injunctive relief regardless of
what actions the federal government might take was further acknowledged in United
States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514 (1954). Recognizing that the interests o f the federal
government may differ from those o f other litigants, the Supreme Court noted that both
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private plaintiffs and the United States could each be entitled to separate injunctions
against the same defendants.7 The statute distinguishes “sharply” between federal
government actions, whether criminal or civil, and those brought by private parties under
15U .S.C. §26.
These private and public actions were designed to be cumulative, not mutually
exclusive. ... Different policy considerations govern each o f these. They may
proceed simultaneously or in disregard o f each other.
347 U.S. at 518-519 (quoting United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1949)). The Court found that the States are thus entitled to seek vindication of
their own quasi-sovereign interest, the protection o f their respective general economies.

B.

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Further Underscores the States’
Ability to Proceed Separately From the Federal Government

After Pennsylvania R. Co. and Borden, in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Congress
expanded the powers o f the States under federal law and underscored its intention that
States may seek injunctive relief under federal antitrust law independent o f the
prosecutorial policies o f the United States.
Section 4(f)(a) o f the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(f)(a), provides,
“ [W jhenever the Attorney General o f the United States has brought an action under the
antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe that any State attorney general would be
entitled to bring an action under this Act based substantially on the same alleged violation
7In Borden, the Court held that refusal to grant the federal government an injunction under federal antitrust
law because o f the existence o f private parties’ injunctions constituted an abuse o f discretion.
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of the antitrust laws, he shall promptly give written notification thereof to such State
attorney general.”
This section recognizes the unique interests o f the States and contemplates the
probability that the States will file suits for injunctive relief with the federal government.
Indeed, the provisions o f the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act were enacted even after federal
enforcers expressed concern that States might complicate federal enforcement cases. See
Sims & Herman, “The Effect o f Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice:
A Case Study In the Law o f Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation,”
65 Antitrust L.J. 865, 874-75 (1997).
In the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Congress created Section 4C o f the Clayton Act
expressly to allow States to use parens patriae authority to obtain damages on behalf of
State residents. During the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act debate, however, Congress clearly
believed that States’ authority to obtain injunctive relief under Section 16 was already
firmly in place. See Burch v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633, 635 (4th Cir.
1977) (quoting extensively from statements o f Senator Hart and Representative Rodino in
the course o f enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and holding that “[a]Legations o f injury
to the general economy of the State" in an antitrust suit filed by the State in a parens
patriae capacity “are sufficient to confer [Section 16] standing upon the Attorney
General”). See also Spitzer v. St. Francis Hospital, 94 F.Supp. 2d 399, 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (upholding State Attorney General’s standing to sue to prevent “an adverse effect
on competition” in the State). Thus, Congress and the courts have long recognized the
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authority o f the State Attorneys General to proceed parens patriae in suits for injunctive
relief under Section 16.

C.

More Recent Court Decisions Confirm the States’ Ability to
Seek R elief Under Section 16, Notwithstanding the Federal
Government’s Pursuit of Different Enforcement Policies

While the protection o f their general economies will, indeed, be consistent with
the public interest, the States’ interpretation o f their respective public interests may differ
from that o f the federal government and, by grant o f authority from Congress under
Section 16, may be asserted under federal antitrust law independent o f any decisions of
the federal government. As the Court recognized in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982), the States’ powers under federal antitrust laws are intended to
assure
that the State and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are
to flow from participation in the federal system. Thus, the State need not
wait for the federal government to vindicate the State’s interest in removal
of barriers to the participation by its residents in the free flow o f interstate
commerce.
458 U.S. at 608. Nor must the States rely upon the discretion o f the federal government to
protect their economies.
In California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990), the Supreme Court
expressly recognized the power o f the State o f California to pursue a case to challenge a
supermarket merger even after the merging parties had reached a settlement with the
Federal Trade Commission permitting them to consummate their merger. In American
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Stores, the Federal Trade Commission had conducted an investigation o f a proposed
merger involving American Stores, a chain operating over 1,500 retail grocery stores in
forty states, and Lucky Stores, which operated in seven Western and Midwestern States.
The FTC negotiated a settlement that included some limited divestitures o f stores. The
day after the FTC gave its final approval to the merger, the State o f California, acting
parens patriae, filed a complaint challenging the merger and seeking divestiture o f all of
Q

Lucky Stores’ assets in California.
The Supreme Court held that a State could obtain divestiture in a challenge to a
merger brought under §16 o f the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §26. In doing so, the Court
reaffirmed that § 16 “was enacted ‘not merely to provide private re lie f,... but to serve as
well the high purpose o f enforcing the antitrust laws.’ We have accordingly applied the
section w ith this purpose in mind and with the knowledge that the remedy it affords, like
other equitable remedies, is flexible and capable o f nice ‘adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private
claims.’” Id. at 284 (citations omitted).
Lower courts also have recognized the right o f States to bring antitrust actions to
advance their citizens’ interests, notwithstanding prior enforcement actions by the federal
government. See, e.g., In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 452 F.
California asserted that the merger, if consummated, would eliminate competition and potential
competition in many relevant geographic markets in the State and that the prices o f food and non-food
products might increase, causing considerable loss and damage to the State.
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Supp. 54, 59 (D.C. Md. 1978) (State o f Maryland had standing to obtain injunctive relief
when bringing a parens patriae action on behalf o f its consumers following a federal
criminal antitrust case, just as “beyond peradventure” the state would have such standing
where it alleges injury to its general economy).
Even in the context o f purely private enforcement o f the antitrust laws, it has been
held that injunctive relief may be sought after settlement by the federal government; such
private actions are “not contingent on any action or lack o f action” by federal enforcement
authorities. Arvin Industries, Inc. v. Meremont Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) *\\ 74,416
at 93,885 (S.D. Indiana, March 9, 1973). Because the Consent Order represented “a
compromise and settlement” o f the charges brought by the Federal Trade Commission
against the defendant, it might not “reflect the full relief available” to the private litigants
under the federal antitrust laws necessary to obtain the “full and complete vindication of
the evils o f monopolies and combinations in restraint o f trade” contemplated by the
federal scheme. Id. See also United States v. Associated M ilk Producers, Inc., 394
F.Supp. 29, 45 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (consent decree obtained by the Department o f Justice in
milk monopolization litigation did not preclude private plaintiffs from seeking “more
stringent re lie f’ in pending private litigation).
In other cases, States have obtained nation-wide relief from alleged antitrust
violations committed by national and international companies when the federal
government declined to challenge this conduct. See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (defendants were national and foreign insurers and
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reinsurers). Additionally, States have pursued parallel investigations with the federal
government to ensure that the States’ interests are protected. See, e.g., New York ex rel.
Abrams v. Primestar Partners, L.P., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)

70,403 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

The States have also, on many occasions, filed complaints in coordination with the
federal government. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., Cl F. Supp. 2d
25, 42 n.8 (D. D.C. 1999)(“all states are entitled to be in federal court to seek injunctive
relief pursuant to §16 o f the Clayton Act”).
In short, there is no authority for the proposition that the power o f the State
Attorneys General to seek injunctive relief under Section 16 is somehow limited when the
wrongful conduct they complain about occurs both within and without their respective
states,9 or when that conduct was also the subject o f litigation brought and settled by the
federal government.

9Indeed, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., the Supreme Court described the conduct alleged in the States’
complaints as “ unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for insurance in the United States ....” 509 U.S.
at 796 (emphasis supplied). Even in his dissent, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the States had successfully
asserted nonfrivolous claims under the Sherman Act. Id. at 812.
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IV.

Conclusion
A decision by this Court that fails to recognize the States’ independent authority

to seek relief under Section 16 will severely injure the States’ ability to perform the
important role they, with the blessing o f Congress, have come to play ip developing and
maintaining competition policy in this nation.
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